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Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code Annotated, 
Sections 78-45a-l, et seq 
SATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the non-joinder of the ex-husband of the mother of 
tne child in a paternity action constitutes grounds for dismissal of 
the paternity action when evidence is received by the trial court 
which established beyond a reasonable doubt that the ex-husband of 
the mother of the child cannot be the biological father of the child 
at issue. 
2. Whether the Divorce Decree between the mother and her 
ex-husband (under the circumstances) e s t a b l i s h e s K under the doctrine 
of res judicata, the paternity of the minor child such that a 
paternity action may not be brought to identify the true biological 
father of the minor child at issue. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a paternity action pursuant to the provisions of the 
Uniform Act on Paternity as enacted in the Utah Code Annotated 
Sections 78-45a-1 et seq, against the alleged biological father of 
the minor child at issue. The minor child at issue, Keith Douglas 
Sandoval, was born to Barbara' Sandoval the 16th day of July, 
1978.(Tr. 6 7 ) . At the time of the birth, M s . Sandoval was married to 
Kenneth Joseph Sandoval. Kenneth and Barbara Sandoval were divorced 
by a Decree of Divorce entered by the Third District Court, State of 
Utah the 23rd day of September, 1981. (Exhibit "A") Although the 
child was born during the marriage of the parties, the child was 
conceived prior to the marriage of the parties and was conceived 
prior to the time that Barbara Sandoval had met Kenneth Sandoval. 
(TR 72, 75, 76) Barbara Sandoval and Kenneth Joseph Sandoval deemed 
Keith Sandoval as a stepchild of Kenneth Joseph Sandoval. (TR. 77) 
The Decree of Divorce and the Findings of Fact underlying the Decree 
of Divorce of the Sandovals does note that the child was born during 
their marriage and that Kenneth Sandoval has a support obligation 
for the minor child which accrued during the time that the Sandovals 
were married. (Exhibit "A") The support obligation was imposed upon 
Mr. Sandoval pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 7 8 - 4 5 - 4 . 1 , which imposes a support obligation upon a step 
parent during the course of that step parent's marriage to the 
natural parent of the child. Prior to the trial of the paternity 
action, one of Mark Canham's attorneys (Mr. Canham during the course 
of the litigation had the services of three separate attorneys) 
filed a motion to join as indispensable parties the mother, Barbara 
S a n d o v a l , and the minor child, Keith Sandoval but not Kenneth Joseph 
S a n d o v a l . (R. ) This motion was never noticed up before the trial 
court nor was any dispositive order entered by the court relative to 
this motion. In the opening minut-es of the trial, counsel for Canham 
delivered to the court and to counsel for the State of Utah a motion 
entitled "Motion in Limine for D i s m i s s a l " . (Tr. 1) In the discussion 
on this motion, the Court determined that the motion was, in 
actuality, a motion to dismiss based upon an alleged failure to join 
an indispensable party and a motion to dismiss based upon the 
alleged determination resolving the issue of paternity in the 
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Sandoval. (Tr 82, 88) The defense presented no evidence whatsoever 
and no rebuttal evidence to that presented by Plaintiff* (Tr 92) The 
trial court rendered its decision through a Memorandum Decision 
dated the 2nd day of October, 1985 with the order dismissing the 
matter being entered by the Court on the 9th day of October, 1985, 
(R ) The trial court's order dismissed the paternity action 
against Mark Ronald Canham on two bases: (1) the failure to join an 
indispensable party and (2) that the Divorce Decree between Barbara 
Sandoval and Kenneth Joseph Sandoval determined the issue of 
paternity of the minor child and through the .application of res 
judicata required dismissal of the paternity action against Ronald 
Canham* 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I* Kenneth Joseph Sandoval, the child's past stepfather, was 
not an indispensable party, under .the guidelines of Provident 
Tradesman Bank & Trust, and the trial court erred in dismissing the 
paternity action, due to his non-joinder* Even if Kenneth Joseph 
Sandoval is a necessary party, the trial court erred in dismissing 
the action rather than ordering Sandoval joined as provided by Rule 
21, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure* 
II* Res judicata (or collateral e s t o p p e l ) , based upon the 
Sandoval's Divorce Decree, does not apply to the paternity action 
against Canham, as all four requisite criteria, under Searle 
Brothers are not met* The trial court received evidence which 
clearly rebutted any Holder presumption and it was estalished that 
s 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See, Provident Tradesman Bank & Trust 
Co, vs. Patterson, 390 US 102, 19 L. Ed., 936, 88 Supreme Court 733 
(1962) fn 4. As provided by Rule 19, of Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court was required to make a determination as to 
whether Kenneth Joseph Sandoval was indeed an indispensable party. 
If the Court found that Mr. Sandoval was an indispensable party, 
Rule 21, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, indicates that the proper 
disposition would have been for the Court to order the joinder of 
Kenneth Joseph Sandoval and not a dismissal of the action. The trial 
court made no specific determination that Kenneth Joseph Sandoval 
was an indispensable party and its dismissal of the paternity action 
was clearly contrary to the provisions of Rule 21, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure* It is the State's contention that if Kenneth Joseph 
Sandoval is an indispensable party, the trial court erred in 
dismissing the action and should have proceeded pursuant to Rule 21, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The State of Utah contends that under the facts and 
circumstances of this case, Kenneth Joseph Sandoval is not an 
indispensable party to the paternity action. The touchstone case 
relative to the determination of a persons's indispensibi1ity to an 
action is Provident Tradesman's Bank and Trust Company vs Patterson, 
390 U.S. 102, 19 L. Ed. 2nd 936, 88 Supreme Court 733, ( 1 9 6 8 ) . In 
that opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court states: 
"Whether a person is 'indispensable 1, that 
is, whether a particular law suit must be 
dismissed in the absence of that person, can only 
be determined in the context of particular 
1 itigation*...To say that a court 'must' dismiss 
in the absence of an indispensable party and that 
it 'cannot proceed 1 without him puts the matter 
in the wrong way around: a court does not know 
whether a particular person is 'indispensable 1 
until it has examined the situation to determine 
whether it can proceed without him". U.S. at 
118, 119 L. Ed. at 950. 
The opinion notes that the trial court is to make a pragmatic 
consideration of the effects of the alternatives of (1) proceeding 
with the action and shaping relief to accommodate the four interests 
identified in the opinion relative to the determination of 
indispensibility or (2) dismissing the action. Using Provident as a 
guideline, analysis shows that Kenneth Joseph Sandoval is not an 
indispensable party, as the trial court could properly proceed 
without his participation in the lawsuit and/or could have shaped 
its relief to accommodate those parties before the court without any 
adverse affect upon Kenneth Joseph Sandoval. 
The State must first contend with the erroneous assumption 
that the Divorce Decree and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered by the District Court in the divorce matter between Barbara 
Sandoval and Kenneth Joseph Sandoval established Kenneth Joseph 
Sandoval as the father of the child. A review of those court 
documents shows that the divorce court simply found that a child had 
been born to Barbara Sandoval on the 16th day of July 1978. No 
specific Finding of Fact, Conclusion of Law or provision of Divorce 
Decree provides that the child was issue of the marriage or was 
fathered by Kenneth Joseph S a n d o v a l . It is evident that care was 
taken in drafting the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce to avoid a conclusion that the divorce court had 
made a determination that the child born during the marriage was 
issue of the marriage and fathered by Kenneth Joseph Sandoval. The 
support obligations as provided in Paragraph 3 of the Divorce 
Decree, are carefully worded to comport with the support obligation 
defined by Utah Code Annotated Section 7 8 - 4 5 - 4 * 1 , which indicates 
that a stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same extent that 
a natural or adoptive parent is required to support a child* The 
support obligation of the stepparent terminates, however, upon the 
termination of the marriage relationship between the stepparent and 
the child's natural parent* The support obligations identified in 
Paragraph 3 of the Divorce Decree are all worded in the past tense, 
indicative of Kenneth Joseph Sandoval's obligation as a stepparent 
only in the past during the time that his marriage to Barbara 
Sandoval was in effect. There was no provision for any future 
support, because pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
Section 7 8 - 4 5 - 4 * 1 , the support obligation ended upon the Divorce 
Decree of Kenneth Joseph Sandoval and Barbara Sandoval* Thus, 
Kenneth Joseph Sandoval had no further interest nor support 
obligation relative to the minor child upon entry of the Divorce 
Decree* It is to be recalled that the evidence presented and 
received by the trial court in this matter established the 
biological impossibility of Kenneth Joseph Sandoval being the 
natural father of this child. With such evidence, Kenneth Joseph 
Sandoval was not an indispensable party or necessary party to the 
action, Torres vs Gonzales, 450 P2d 921 (New Mexico 1 9 6 9 ) . (Evidence 
was sufficient to rebut presumption that husband was father of the 
child such that husband was not a necessary party and indispensable 
party to the a c t i o n ) . The trial court erred in dismissing the action 
as it failed to comply with the guidelines elucidated in Provident 
Tradesman's Bank and Trust Company vs Patterson, supra, and, in 
light of the evidence received by the trial court rebutting the 
presumption the child born during the marriage of the Sandoval's was 
fathered by Kenneth Joseph Sandoval, Kenneth Joseph Sandoval was not 
a necessary party. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE DIVORCE DECREE BETWEEN BARBARA SANDOVAL AND KENNETH JOSEPH 
SANDOVAL WAS AN INSUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT 
THE PATERNITY OF THE CHILD HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED UNDER THE DOCTRINE 
OF RES JUDICATA (OR COLLATERAL E S T O P P E L ) . 
Although the trial court's Memorandum Decision and the Order 
entered by the trial court dismissing this action bases its 
dismissal upon the doctrine of res judicata, res judicata may not be 
used in this matter due to the lack of identity of parties in the 
Sandoval divorce and the paternity action herein. Although the trial 
court erroneously used the term, res judicata, the correct term 
should be collateral estoppel. See, Searle Brothers vs Searle, 588 
P2d 689 (Utah 1 9 7 8 ) . In that opinion, this Court adopted four 
criteria to establish whether a party is collaterally estopped from 
1itigating an i ssue: 
"1* Was the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication identical with the one 
presented in the action in question? 2* 
Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is 
asserted a party or in privity with a party 
to the prior adjudication? 4. Was the 
issue in the first case completely, fully 
and fairly litigated?". Supra, at 691. 
The Sandoval divorce proceeding fails to meet the requirements of 
this test* The issue of paternity of Keith Sandoval was not an issue 
raised in the divorce proceedings between Barbara Sandoval and 
Kenneth Joseph S a n d o v a l . The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Divorce Decree in the Sandoval divorce matter deal with Kenneth 
Joseph Sandoval's support obligation to his stepchild as defined by 
Utah Code Annotated Section 7 8 - 4 5 - 4 * 1 , as discussed previously* All 
parties in the divorce action were aware that Kenneth Joseph 
Sandoval was not the natural father of the child Keith Sandoval* All 
parties were aware that Keith Sandoval fell under the definition of 
a child born out of wedlock as provided by Utah Code Annotated 
Sectin 7 8 - 4 5 a - l , which provides in part: "A child born out of 
wedlock includes a child born to a married woman by a man other than 
her husband." The paternity of the minor child never having been 
raised as an issue or litigated in any previous court proceeding, it 
was appropriate for the Department of Social Services to proceed 
with the paternity action against the alleged natural father of the 
child pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Act on Paternity* 
The trial court received sufficient, and uncontroverted, 
evidence to rebut the presumption that the subject child was 
fathered by Kenneth Joseph Sandoval, which presumption results from 
this Court's opinion in Holder vs Holder, 340 P2d 761 (1959). The 
Hoider opinion, however, indicates that this is a rebuttable 
presumption which exists until, "sense and reason are outraged by 
holding that it abides," Supra, at 763* The trial court received 
testimony from Barbara Sandoval that at the time of conception of 
the minor child at issue herein, she had sexual intercourse only 
with Mark Ronald Canham, the alleged natural father of this child* 
She further testified that at the time she met Kenneth Joseph 
S andoval, she suspected she was and in fact was pregnant with the 
child* She had no sexual contact with Kenneth Joseph Sandoval until 
after she had already conceived the minor child at issue herein* 
That testimony was received by the .trial court without any objection 
made by Canham nor any motion to strike that testimony* Canham 
failed to object to such testimony or move to strike such testimony 
under the provisions of Lopes vs Lopes, 30 U2d 393, 518 P2d 687 
(1974) (wherein this Court adopted the Lord Mansfield R u l e ) * Such 
objection or motion would have been unfounded* Rule 101, Utah Rules 
of Evidence, provides: "These rules govern proceedings in the courts 
of this state, to the extent and with the exceptions stated in Rule 
1101*" The committee notes to Rule 101 state that Rule 101 adopts 
the general policy making the Rules of Evidence applicable to all 
instances in Courts of Utah and rejects Lopes vs Lopes to the extent 
that Lopes permits development and use of special rules of court 
inconsistent with the Rules of Evidence. Rule 601, Utah Rules of 
11 
Evidence, provides at Paragraph ( a ) : "Every person is competent to 
be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules*" See, also 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-11* There is no provision found 
in Utah Rules of Evidence which could preclude Barbara Sandoval from 
testifying relative to the time that she conceived the minor child 
and to the time that she met Kenneth Joseph Sandoval. The Utah Rules 
of Evidence explicitly supersede this Court's ruling in Lopes vs 
Lopes, supra, hence, the testimony of Barbara Sandoval was properly 
received by the trial court* The trial court also received testimony 
of Dr. Charles DeWitt who testified that Kenneth Joseph Sandoval is 
biologically incapable of being the father of the minor child. This 
testimony of Dr. Charles DeWitt was received by the trial court, 
again, without any objections or motion to strike being made by 
Canham. The testimony of Dr. Charles DeWitt would not have been 
under the purview of Lopes vs Lopes, supra, and was competently 
received by the court. Hales vs Hales *656 P2d 423 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) . With 
such evidence being received by the court, the trial court erred in 
its ruling because the presumption that Kenneth Joseph Sandoval was 
the father of Keith Sandoval, (pursuant to the presumption required 
in Holder vs Holder, supra,) was sufficiently rebutted such that 
"common sense and reason are outraged by holding that it abides". 
Holder vs Holder, supra, at 763. The trial court erred in raising, 
sua sponte, the Lord Mansfield Rule to disregard the evidence 
received by it. "For the law to exclude the very evidence which may 
go to the heart of the issue in controversy on the basis of a public 
19 
policy which has ceased to exist, is to blind ourselves to the 
realities of today,, , (t) h a t was a rule for an era in which - child 
once considered illegitimate had no capacity to become 
legitimized,,," Coffman vs Coffman, 591 P2d 1110 (Arizona 1979) (In 
Coffman the Arizona Court overruled the application of the Lord 
Mansfield Rule in the case, and established that a child born during 
a marriage was not fathered by the husband,) This error of the trial 
court is particularly blatant in light of the provisions of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence and the Committee Notes to the rules, discussed 
above* The trial court erred in its ruling that the divorce action 
between the S a n d o v a l s , wherein it is clear that the divorce court 
determined the support obligation of Kenneth Joseph Sandoval as a 
stepfather to Keith Sandoval, established Kenneth Joseph Sandoval as 
Keith S a n d o v a l l s natural father and applied the Divorce Decree of 
the Sandovals under the doctrine of res judicata to the paternity 
action against Mark Ronald Canham* The trial court !s ruling 
frustrates the public policies and underlying legislative intent in 
codifying the obligations of a father in Utah Code Annotated 
Sections 7 8 - 4 5 - 3 , 78-45a-l and,, 78-45b-4,l* Children are to be 
maintained from the resources of responsible parents and; it is the 
natural or adoptive parents of the child to whom the duty of support 
attaches* "In our view, the husband of the natural mother of an 
illegitimate child of which he is not the natural father, is not the 
p a r e n t 1 of the child merely because married to the mother*" Torres 
vs G o n z a l e s , supra, at 9 2 2 . Although Kenneth Joseph Sandoval may 
have been married to Barbara Sandoval at the time of birth of Keith 
Sandoval, he is not the father or the responsible parent of the 
child. It was error to dismiss the paternity action when the trial 
court had received adequate testimony and evidence to show that the 
presumption of legitimacy had been controverted and rebutted beyond 
a reasonable doubt. (Furthermore, the matter of Kenneth Joseph 
Sandoval being the natural father of Keith Sandoval was not even a 
proper issue of consideration.) The trial court's ruling frustrates 
the applicable public policies and ignores considerations the trial 
court must apply to require the responsible, natural-father parent 
to provide support to his child to relieve the burden placed upon 
the citizenry of the State of Utah through the provision of public 
assistance and welfare for his child. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully moves this Court to remand the matter 
for new trial or to remand the case with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff, in light of the evidence received by 
the trial court. 
DATED this day of March, 1986. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing were mailed 
to the Defendant/Respondent, Mark Ronald Canham at 5685 South 4540 
West, West Valley City, Utah 84120 on this ^V^ day of March, 
1986. 
Attorney *.or t'lamiui 
Clark Leading Office Center 
Fifth Floor Law Suite 
175 South West Temple #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-6424 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA SANDOVAL AND THE : 
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROVGU : 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH JOE SANDOVAL, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
: Civil No. D81-832 
Pursuant to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law made and entered in this action, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from 
UfttJ 
Defendant, the same to become final thrtc monthc after entry. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and 
control of the minor child born during the parties1 marriage, 
subject to Defendant's reasonable and generous rights of visi 
tion. 
3. Pursuant to §78-45-9 and §78-45b-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, the State of Utah is entitled tc 
collect from Defendant child support accrued during the time 
plaintiff received public assistance for or on account of th< 
minor child born to plaintiff during the parties1 marriage. 
4. The parties have separated and divided their p« 
sonal property, and each party is awareded, free of any 
claim of the other, all items of personal property which are 
in his or her possession, custody or control, and each party 
shall be free to dispose of all such items as well as other 
items of personal property which may hereafter be acquired b 
the i r respect ive sole ob l iga t ions . 
7. Each party shal l pay his or her own a t to rney ' s 
fees and costs incurred in th i s act ion. 
DATED th i s ^2 l l (day of (/pti^tfJwJ 1981. 
BY THE COURT: 
ITRICT JUDGE * y T f j DISTRI   * ATTEST 
W. STERLING EVAN'S 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
 BY p A ^ ' ^ l U ^ 
I hereby certify that I mailed, U. S. mail, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law to Defendant KENNETH JOE SANDOVAL, 
at U. S. Army, HHC-82nd Enc. Bn. -APD, New York, New York 0913. 
and to Jeffrey H. Thorpe, Deputy County Attorney, at 2250 Sout! 
Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah 84119, this *7f day of 
, 1981. 
MARK R. EMMETT 
s^urt-
MARK R. EMMETT 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Clark Learning Office Center 
Fifth Floor Law Suite 
175 South West Temple 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-6424 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IK AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA SANDOVAL AND THE : 
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH : 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH JOE SANDOVAL, 
Defendant, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
: Civil No. D81-832 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on th< 
8th day of September, 1981, Plaintiff appearing in person and 
her attorney, Mark R. Emmett, and Defendant not appearing in ' 
son or by counsel, and it appearing that Defendant has signed 
Acceptance of Service, Entry of Appearance and Notice of Waiv< 
which has been filed herein, wherein Defendant entered his 
appearance, acknowledged receipt of a copy of the Summons and 
Complaint in this action, accepted service of the same and co 
sented that his default could be entered and Plaintiff take 
judgment according to the prayer of her Complaint, and the 
default of Defendant having been entered and Plaintiff having 
testified to matters set forth in her Complaint, and the Cour 
being fully advised in the premises, hereby makes the followi 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, St 
of Utah, was such on the date the Complaint herein was filed, 
had been for more than three months immediately prior to the 
mencement of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband, 
having married on March 3, 1978, at Kearns, Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
uEhrrr CLERK 
3. During tne marriage, Defendant indicated to 
Plaintiff by his words and actions that he no longer loved 
Plaintiff and no longer wished to remain married to her. 
4. The parties own no real property. 
5. During the marriage, a child was born to Plaintifi 
to-wit: Keith Douglas Sandoval, born July 16, 1978. 
6. Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be awardec 
the care, custody and control of the minor child born during the 
parties' marriage, subject to Defendant's reasonable and generoi 
right of visitation. 
7. Defendant has failed to provide support and 
Plaintiff and the said minor child have received public 
assistance from the Utah State Department of Social Services; 
pursuant to §78-45-9 and §78-45b-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, c 
amended, the State of Utah has a right to collect child support 
accrued during the time Plaintiff received public assistance. 
8. The parties have separated and divided their per-
sonal property, and henceforth each party should own, free of ar 
claim of the other, all items of personal property which are nov. 
in his or her possession, custody or control, and each party 
should be free to dispose of all such items as well as other 
items of personal property which may hereafter be acquired by hi 
or her as fully and effectively as if he or she were unmarried. 
9. The parties have no joint debts or obligations and 
each party should hold the other harmless from all 'debts and 
obligations incurred by such party either before or after the 
filing of the Complaint herein. Each party should assume and pa 
their respective sole obligations. 
10. Each party should pay his or her own attorney's 
fees and costs incurred in this action. 
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Pursuant to the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
hereby makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant's behavior described in Finding 3 above 
constituted cruel treatment of Plaintiff, and caused Plaintiff 
great mental distress. 
2. Plaintiff shall be awcrded a Decree of Divorce frc 
Defendant, the same to become final-three monthc after entry. 
3. Plaintiff shall be awarded the care, custody and 
control of the minor child born during the parties' marriage, 
subject to Defendant's reasonable and generous rights of visita-
tion. 
4. Pursuant to §78-45-9 and §78-45b-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, the State of Utah is entitled to 
collect from Defendant child support accrued during the time 
Plaintiff received public assistance for or on account of the 
minor child born to Plaintiff during the parties' marriage. 
5. The parties have separated and divided their per-
sonal property, and henceforth each party shall own, free of anv 
claim of the other, all items of personal property which are nov> 
in his or her possession, custody or control, and each party 
shall be free to dispose of all such items as well as other 
items of personal property which may hereafter be acquired by hi 
or her as fully and effectively as if he or she were unmarried. 
6. The parties have no joint debts or obligations anc 
each party shall hold the other harmless from all debts and 
obligations incurred by such party either before or after the 
filing of the Complaint herein. Each party shall assume and pa} 
-3-
or her as fully and effectively as if he or she were unroarriec 
5. The parties have no joint debts or obligations i 
each party shall hold the other harmless from all debts and 
obligations incurred by such party either before or after the 
filing of the Complaint herein. Each party shall assume and p 
their respective sole obligations. 
6. Each party shall pay his or her own attorney's 
fees and costs incurred in this action. 
DATED this c^&Lday of (TUII^^AJ , 1981. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT J U D G E / A T T E S T 
W STERLING EVAN'S 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING -Byv 
I hereby certify that I mailed, U* S. mail, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of 
Divorce to Defendant KENNETH JOE SANDOVAL, at U. S. Army, 
HHC-82nd Enc. Bn. -APD, New York, New York 09139, and to Jeffre 
H. Thorpe, Deputy County Attorney, at 2250 South Redwood Road, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119, this 
1981. 
MARK R. EMMETT 
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